Abstract. The primary theme of this paper is the normative case against ownership of one's genetic information along with the source of that information (usually human tissues samples). The argument presented here against such ''upstream'' property rights is based primarily on utilitarian grounds. This issue has new salience thanks to the Human Genome Project and ''bio-prospecting'' initiatives based on the aggregation of genetic information, such as the one being managed by deCODE Genetics in Iceland. The rationale for ownership is twofold: ownership will protect the basic human rights of privacy and autonomy and it will enable the data subjects to share in the tangible benefits of the genetic research. Proponents of this viewpoint often cite the principle of genetic exceptionalism, which asserts that genetic information needs a higher level of protection than other kinds of personal information such as financial data. We argue, however, that the recognition of such ownership rights would lead to inefficiency along with the disutility of genetic discoveries. Biomedical research will be hampered if property rights in genes and genetic material are too extensive. We contend that other mechanisms such as informed consent and strict confidentiality rules can accomplish the same result as a property right without the liabilities of an exclusive entitlement.
Introduction
In order to appreciate the issues in the dispute about genetic information, some background on cell biology is essential. Cells are the basic units of all living organisms. Within cells are the nuclei or life force of the cells. DNA and RNA are the nucleic acids found in an organism's cells, and DNA is the molecule that stores genetic material. There is about six feet of DNA within the nucleus of every cell. DNA serves as the building blocks of genes, that is, each molecule of DNA is organized into genes, which are the units of heredity. Genes are organized into chromosomes and it is through chromosomes that genetic information is transmitted. A human's chromosomes contain approximately 30,000 genes, and this complete set of genes is known as the human genome. The Human Genome Project is an international effort to map and sequence these genes. This effort is enabling genetic testing, that is, a test of an individual's DNA, which records genetic information in the form of a four letter alphabet. Through a blood test or tissue sample it will be possible to determine aspects of an individual's genetic makeup, which, in conjunction with the human genome map, will allow doctors to determine if an individual has genes that predispose that individual to a certain illness or other debility. A key objective of this project is to single out errant genes that are the basis for certain diseases such as colon cancer or diabetes. The perennial hope of uncovering such primordial data is that it will provide new cures and treatments for diseases caused by genetic mutations.
The mapping of the genome and the advent of genetic testing have triggered a plethora of perplexing ethical conundrums. The most prominent of these involve the interconnected issues of privacy and the ownership of one's ''genetic information.'' That information is broadly defined as information about genes, gene products, or one's inherited characteristics that is derived from a genetic test or a person's DNA sample. A DNA sample refers to any human biological specimen such as human tissue or blood from which DNA can be extracted. Genetic information includes information about any individual's genetic test results or genetically linked diseases. For our purposes, it also includes each person's unique genetic code (or sequence), which can be valuable if there is a genetic variation or mutation in that code that is the cause of a genetic disease. 2 We will refer to these various forms of genetic information and its bodily source (that is, the DNA sample) as genetic source material. The expansive version of the property argument is that ownership rights should be conferred on genetic source material including the human tissue sample and any information about the genes derived therefrom. There are narrower versions of this argument but in general what we are talking about is the proprietary ''rights of sources.''
The major rationale for providing these rights is the protection of privacy. Obviously, if this information becomes too widely available or falls into the wrong hands, one's privacy rights are put in the gravest peril. While some maintain that genetic information (in the form of test results) is just an additional component of a person's overall medical record, others support the position of ''genetic exceptionalism,'' that is, ''genetic information is sufficiently different from other kinds of health-related information that it needs special protection''. 3 Hence, if this position has plausibility, it is imperative that genetic information be regulated more stringently than other forms of personal data. Currently, there are no specific federal laws regulating the dissemination of this information, despite the fact that genetic testing (that is, testing of DNA to ascertain an individual's predisposition to a genetic illness or impairment) is becoming more widespread.
The premise of genetic exceptionalism is certainly credible. To begin with, this information is revealing not just about a single individual's medical condition but about the potential condition of his or her relatives as well. Also, while one can change other features or bad habits (e.g., drug addiction) that could lead to discrimination, one's genetic code is fixed and unchangeable. It creates an indelible mark on a person's history, and that ''mark'' might work against a person's legitimate interests if it becomes known by others. Finally, genetic information is unique in that it doesn't just reveal one's present condition but also future probabilities and predispositions to certain ailments. One's DNA is analogous to a ''diary'' of a person's future medical conditions. Therefore, unlike other forms of data, it is subject to broad and subjective interpretation, opening up considerable room for bias and manipulation. If an employer administers a drug test the employee either passes or fails that test; there is usually nothing ambiguous about the results. But what if the same employee takes a genetic test and it reveals that he has Gene X which causes diabetes depending upon one's overall genetic background? Perhaps if this mutation were put into a hundred people with different genetic backgrounds thirty of them would contract this disease. What is an employer to make of such information? The 30% probability of diabetes may be enough not to hire or promote this person, but how can one defend the equity of such discriminatory decision making?
Thus, if privacy is a necessary condition of one's security and well-being in our modern, computerized society, 4 preserving the confidentiality of genetic information is of paramount importance. The potential for discrimination and stigmatization is significant and the dignitary harm suffered by the careless dissemination of this predictive data is beyond dispute.
Some of those who support the principle of genetic exceptionalism argue that a property right to one's genetic information would be the most viable means of securing the confidentiality of that information. But if property rights proliferated, and the collection and dissemination of genetic information became too restricted, downstream genetic research would likely suffer. Clearly, an individual's private genetic information when combined with other data or the genetic information of other people can be an extremely valuable research tool. There is well-founded apprehension that an overemphasis on privacy and data protection might preclude or interfere with such research.
Thus, the issue of genetic privacy is deeply intertwined with the question of ownership, and this connection will be the main focus of attention in the following sections of his paper. Who (if anyone) should have a proprietary interest in a person's specific genetic information or the source of that information? Should a person's genetic source material belong to that person and be classified as his or her personal property? Should any of that material be regarded as part of the public domain? Is it fair for researchers to receive patents for genes extracted from individuals, especially given that those individuals do not share in the rewards when their genetic material is later commercialized? deCODE genetics and icelandic healthcare database These contentious issues have come to the surface in the controversy swirling around the Iceland database of genetic information managed by deCODE Genetics, a genomics company located in Iceland. In exchange for its investment and its work to collect and manage this data, the Iceland government agreed to give deCODE Genetics exclusive research access to the genetic data of its citizens.
Iceland's Act on a Health Sector Database 5 authorized the creation of this comprehensive nationwide data base that aggregates disparate sources of medical and genetic information. This Icelandic Healthcare Database (IHD) links together separate data bases of medical records, genealogical records, and genetic information based on DNA samples received voluntarily from over 10,000 citizens. deCODE's choice of Iceland was based in part upon the genetic homogeneity of its population. Scientists believe that since the Vikings settled here in the Ninth century, the genetic code of the Icelanders has changed only marginally. A major objective of IHD research is that it will provide a better understanding of disease by examining the interaction of the environment and genetics. deCODE has already built pedigrees for patients with certain diseases by scanning the genomes of relatives searching for a chromosome segment that was inherited from a common ancestor; it then uses these segments to look for an errant gene that might contribute to a disease. According to Wade, 6 ''[w] ith this method, deCODE has identified several diseasecausing genes, including one for schizophrenia, and has inferred the general location of some others.'' Despite its promising results, this ambitious project has attracted trenchant criticism from within and outside the country. The most vigorous resistance within the country has come from the Association of Icelanders for Ethics and Science (Mannvernd) and the Icelandic Medical Association (IMA) According to Mannvernd, ''the interests of the company [de-CODE] are being put first in order to make money''.
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The IMA's opposition has been based upon ''concern about inadequate measures to protect privacy, the lack of access to data among academic researchers, and the belief that individual consent should be required before inclusion of medical records in the data base''. 8 Although Iceland's Act on the Rights of Patients calls for medical privacy to be safeguarded through the principle of informed consent, such consent was not sought from all those participants in the medical records segment of the deCODE database. Those individuals have a right to opt out, however. According to the Database Act (1998), patients can ''request that the information on him/her not be entered into the Health Sector Database.'' The information in the genetics segment has come only from volunteers who have provided DNA samples and have given their informed consent for inclusion in this data base. On the other hand, Icelanders cannot ''refuse to allow data on their deceased parents to be entered into the database''.
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Donors have been assured that privacy safeguards will protect their data. Accordingly, scientists working with this genetic data are blocked from seeing names or other personal information (through encryption) so they are working with anonymous information. Some critics (like the IMA) are skeptical, however, that despite these safeguards there may be inadvertent or even intentional breaches of confidentiality. There are also concerns about the inclusion of genetic information of the deceased in the IHD. In one legal challenge to the Database Act the daughter of a deceased man sought unsuccessfully to exclude her father's information from the IHD. According to Pinto (2002) , ''the plaintiff in this lawsuit fears that inferences may be drawn about her private life from the data obtained from her father.'' Since there is a decryption key for this data it is possible that someone will access the information and trace the deceased man's genetic makeup back to this woman. The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Iceland.
Even if we concede that privacy rights are adequately protected (and that is far from evident), there The Icelandic Government has contended that health and genetic data is a national resource, so individuals have no proprietary rights to that data. According to Jonatansson 10 , ''The Government's rationale is that the normal principles of proprietary rights are not applicable to health data because the information has been gathered by the Government, and therefore with public funding, by virtue of the Government's obligation to provide appropriate medical assistance.'' In other words, the government's view is that the collection of this data at its expense gives it exclusive stewardship and engenders at least a quasi-property right. Despite the government's assurances, questions about this approach linger. Can citizens trust the government to exercise responsible stewardship with unwavering consistency so that the confidentiality of this data is never in doubt? Clearly, this information does have financial value but it is by no means obvious how that value can be most equitably appropriated.
Presiding over all this, of course, is the most crucial question -should a person own or have some proprietary right to his or her medical and genetic information (and its source)? Will such an ownership right better protect the confidentiality of this sensitive data and allow for a ''just'' sharing of the rewards of genetic research? The Iceland Government presumes otherwise, but this question clearly needs more critical attention.
This sort of property issue has been raised before in the debate regarding ownership of personal data (one's name, address, phone number, etc.). It is instructive to review the arguments in that debate to discern their applicability to these concerns regarding the ownership of genetic information.
During the early discussions about data protection many advocated such ownership, primarily as a means of protecting personal privacy. Scholars such as Westin, 11 Miller, 12 and Branscomb 13 have postulated that individuals should have property rights in all personal information about themselves. Personal information includes the simplest data about an individual such as name, address, phone number, birthday, along with facts about one's financial history or credit background. It is the set of data that describes our unique backgrounds and history.
According to Westin (1967) , ''personal information thought of as the right of decisions over one's private personality, should be defined as a property right with all the restraints on interference by public and private authorities and due process guarantees that our law of property has been so skillful in devising. '' Branscomb (1994) made a similar argument, underscoring the tangible benefits that could accrue from such ownership:
Our names and addresses and personal transactions are valuable information assets worthy of recognition that we have property rights in them.
Unless we assert those rights we will lose them. If such information has economic value, we should receive something of value in return for its use by others. Finally, Miller (1969) claimed that the best safeguard for privacy was ''a property right vested in the subject of the data and eligible for the full range of constitutional and legal protection that attach to property.'' Once information is regarded as one's private personal property, as an asset with legal attributes, the legal system can begin to develop a set of laws and appropriate regulations. Those nuanced regulations will define when information should be protected from misappropriation, how individuals should be compensated when their information is used by a third party, and when information must be relinquished for the sake of social, public policy, or even technological priorities. Property rights, of course, are not absolute and just as one's physical property may be subject in extreme cases to eminent domain, one's personal information may at times need to be relinquished for the common good.
Such, in general terms, was the rationale for the legal ownership of personal data. This idea was never embraced, however, for a plethora of reasons including strong opposition of direct marketers and other corporate interests which feared higher costs. But do any of the arguments in favor of information property rights constitute a convincing case for a narrower version of this proposal, that is, for the ownership of genetic information and perhaps even the source of that information (DNA samples)? Do they suggest a paradigm for the treatment of this highly sensitive (and sometimes valuable) personal data? Given the validity of genetic exceptionalism, it could be argued that genetic data requires the highest level of data protection, that is, the assignment of proprietary rights.
Legal support for privacy-enhancing proprietary rights
While it may not be obvious that proprietary rights are necessary for privacy, it is obvious that the inappropriate release of genetic information can be devastating. As we have seen, it could easily lead to employment discrimination, denial of health insurance coverage, and other forms of dignitary harm or stigmatization due to rash and oversimplified judgements. Hence the concern about genetic privacy is not misplaced or exaggerated and some lawmakers have contemplated the use of a property regime to ensure the protection of genetic privacy.
In the United States there are no federal laws that specifically protect genetic privacy, but the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HI-PAA) does offer protection to all types of medical information. According to HIPAA genetic test results are considered to be ''protected health information.'' But critics argue that HIPAA provides ''minimal protection'' and does ''little to preserve the privacy of all genetic test results''. 14 There have been serious proposals for more specific legislation such as a national Genetic Privacy Act (GPA). Advocates of a GPA see the need for a ''unified approach,'' reassuring the public that genetic information is fully protected.
15 One popular version of this GPA claims that it must ''grant a federal property interest in one's own genetic material as well as the right to order the destruction of one's DNA samples ''. 16 According to the original draft of this Act, ''an individually identifiable DNA sample is the property of the sample source''. 17 Advocates of this legislation have consistently argued that a federal property right would protect privacy and enhance clarity about ownership rights in a way that would actually promote commerce by increasing research. They contend that patients would now be incentivized to allow the use of their genetic materials in exchange for a possible monetary reward.
A number of states have enacted legislation to safeguard genetic privacy, and several have sought to use the framework of property rights. New Jersey's genetic privacy statute tried to incorporate a limited property right in genetic tissue samples as a means of allowing individuals to maintain control over their genetic material. Pharmaceutical companies objected, however, since the property right would allow people to demand royalties from products that might be derived from that material. Eventually, New Jersey gave in to these concerns and the property right idea was abandoned (Weems, 2003) .
Oregon's Genetic Privacy Act of 1999 boldly declared that genetic information was an individual's personal property. The Oregon legislature saw proprietary rights as the key to securing privacy protection when it enacted that landmark legislation. But researchers and scientists complained that the assignment of a proprietary right to each individual's genetic information (including their genetic code) would be a major obstacle to genetic research. As a result, the law was modified in 2001 -the property interest was removed, though criminal penalties would still be imposed for the misappropriation of genetic data. Some privacy advocates, however, were quick to find fault with Oregon's reversal: ''By removing the property interest that had been given to individuals with regard to genetic information, Oregon has decreased the strength of privacy associated with their genes' ' (McLochlin, 2001) .
McLochlin suggests that Oregon was on the right track and capitulated too easily to the demands of the scientific community and biotech companies. To be sure, a proprietary right would be a highly efficacious means of preserving one's privacy. As Miller (1969) indicated a ''property right vested in the subject'' is the surest way to give someone autonomous control over that information whether it be financial data or one's genetic code. Such a solution also seems to serve the end of distributive justice since people would share in the benefits of research in a way that is proportionate to their contribution. In Branscomb's (1994) terms, if this genetic information is a valuable asset why shouldn't individuals be compensated for its commercial utilization by a third party? This ownership right and the subsequent negotiations might also engender trust between researchers and donors, especially if the nature of the research on this genetic material became more transparent in that process. Rule and Hunter, 18 who also advocate property rights in personal data, describe how the granting of such rights will ''generate a new balance of power,'' since owners will now be able to collect royalties for use of their information. According to this classic market-based solution, then, each individual would have exclusive ownership rights over his or her genetic information and source material, and be entitled to compensation for its usage by third parties. That compensation would be determined through ''a direct market between buyer and seller with prices based on what people are willing to pay and accept''.
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Self-determination and proprietary rights
A second argument for property rights in one's genetic information emanates from those concerned about ''bio-prospecting,'' that is, the use of genetic material of indigenous people in order to develop valuable cell lines for profit. Indigenous people have been popular targets of genetic studies, since their isolation may result in unique genetic traits that enable them to resist disease. Ching 20 cites the example of an indigenous group in Panama known as the Guaymi. The U.S. Commerce Department sought to patent the cell line of a Guaymi woman because it believed that this cell line possessed anti-viral qualities. Neither the woman nor her tribe were informed about the patent nor were they asked permission before the patent application was filed. When the patent came to light, the Guaymi tribal president vigorously objected, noting that the patent was ''contrary to the Guaymi view of nature,'' and the patent application was eventually withdrawn. Ching (1997) cites other examples of ''molecular colonialism'' where genetic samples of indigenous populations have been harvested without proper notice or compensation. In cases such as the one involving the Guaymi, the autonomy rights of indigenous people are being ignored for the sake of profitable research.
A case can be put forth that the basic human right of autonomy and self-determination encompasses the right of all individuals to have maximum control over their genetic information. And many contend that such control is most effectively realized by a legal regime that grants a property right in this data. Accordingly, Ching (1997) calls for the recognition of ''indigenous peoples' property right to their genetic material,'' though such rights might have a different structure than they do in Western cultures. She claims that this right will protect the autonomy of these people and allow them to share in the benefits of the research. In short, a property right will prevent the rampant spread of unabated gene piracy. Ching (1997) recognizes the potential downside for genetic research but argues that ''the burden on researchers that would be created by recognizing a property interest in indigenous peoples' excised cells and any marketable derivative would not have the crippling effect envisioned by those who resist such rights.'' This general approach suggested by Ching and other scholars is not confined to indigenous people, but applies to anyone who provides genetic material or undergoes genetic testing. The core argument stipulates the necessity of granting property rights in genetic source material, that is, recognizing selfownership of tissues and organs and the genetic information derived from those substances. The implication is that the gene or gene sequence derived from this raw material is not eligible for patent protection by the third parties that excise these cells and then isolate and purify the gene. Nor is the genetic data correlated and stored in a data base eligible for a proprietary claim by the company or researcher who has aggregated genetic test results. The problem is that these claims contradict the prior ''rights'' of those sources who provide this material.
According to Boyle, 21 the general rights of sources argument might go something like this: ''You can't own this gene because I owned it first. My genetic information is my property. Your gene sequences came originally from a source and source's claims should be recognized, either instead of or as well as, the person seeking the patent.' ' Boyle (2003) notes that this claim often comes from those who have provided genetic material to a research project from which a valuable genetic sequence was derived or from families with a particular genetic disorder who want ''to ensure that the development of tests and treatments for the disorder protects the interests of the patients involved.'' Flaws with the property-rights approach In summary, then, property rights are seen as a means of protecting the privacy rights and autonomy of individuals whose genetic information or materials is sought for purposes of research, identification, or as part of a personal profile. Those rights can also ensure that compensation is paid to donors in those situations where it is warranted. With property rights each individual donor will have maximum control. That individual can restrict the flow of genetic information as she sees fit, or even charge licensing fees for the use of such data. By relying on a legally enforceable property claim the person donating the genetic material can demand a share in the revenues of the downstream products derived from that material such as diagnostic tests or treatments.
It is axiomatic, therefore, that a property right will efficiently protect the interests of patients and donors. But, despite the laudable intentions embodied in this property rights approach to genetic source material, there are notable disadvantages and externalities. The major problem with the adoption of a property rights regime for genetic information is economic inefficiency. Fragmented property rights in the genetic data coming from multiple sources would require a substantial integration effort if that data were needed for a particular research project. The higher transaction costs imposed by a property regime would almost certainly constitute an obstacle for biomedical research. A market which recognizes these ''upstream'' property rights, such as monopolistic patents for genes or proprietary rights in genetic data, would function by licensing this ''property'' to downstream researchers and biotech firms which are working to develop treatments of genetically based diseases and diagnostic tools. Consider the impediments to that downstream research such as the negotiations with multiple owners required by this property regime, the payment of licensing fees to these owners, the likelihood that some of the owners will act opportunistically and hold up the project. All of this will greatly inhibit research and increase the cost of important end products. Thus, the adverse social and economic effects of recognizing these rights seems beyond dispute. But what does the law have to say about the property rights of sources?
In the most pertinent legal case of Moore v. Regents of California 22 the California Supreme Court rejected Moore's claim that his property right had been violated when doctors did not share the commercial gains they had obtained through the use of his surgically excised spleen cells. A key issue in this case was whether or not Moore owned his human tissue source along with the genetic information coded into his cells, but the court concluded that he did not have a valid ownership claim. The court's rationale was that the bestowal of such a property right would hinder scientific research: ''this exchange of scientific materials, which is still relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of a lawsuit'' (Moore v. Regents of California, 1990) . The court was worried that the nascent biotechnology industry would be irreparably harmed if researchers were forced to ''investigate the consensual pedigree of each human cell sample used in research'' (Moore v. Regents of California, 1990) . In making its decision the Moore court at least implicitly rejected the claim that researchers were bound to share the sometimes ample rewards of that research with those who contribute human tissue (or other samples) like Mr. Moore.
The problem, underscored in the Moore decision, is that society has a critical interest in stimulating biomedical research. And this includes the kind of research that is being conducted by deCODE Genetics. As Harrison 23 observes, progress in biotechnology research will become ''unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools.'' Property held in common is subject to a ''tragedy of the commons,'' since individual incentives are often at variance with the collective good. Each individual's marginal exploitation of some common property (such as a fertile track of land) ultimately destroys that property. But if we effectively remove valuable scientific data from the intellectual commons through the assignment of proprietary rights we get the opposite of a tragedy of the commons, that is, a tragedy of the anti-commons. 24 In this case too few resources are held in common and researchers are blocked from There is considerable risk, therefore, that excessive ownership of information inputs, such as genetic data, and other source material will impose high costs and formidable burdens on the flow of critical scientific information. Biomedical research depends upon the open availability of genetic data resources so long as privacy is ensured. High transaction costs and perverse anti-commons effects, however, will undermine that availability if property rights are granted. Also, while ownership might result in some compensation for those individuals who license their genetic sequences or sell their genetic information, that compensation will be trivial in most cases, and it will be far offset by the social good of better healthcare that will be realized by research efforts unencumbered by these transaction costs.
One of the ironies of the Moore case, however, is that the court seemed to contradict itself. It refused to recognize a property right for Moore in the name of research but it concluded that the collectors of genetic data would need such a property right (in the form of a patent) as an incentive. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, ''the theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research'' (Moore v. Regents of California, 1990). As Boyle 25 points out, the notion that ''property rights must be given to those who do the mining [of genetic material]'' is indicative of the ''doctrinal chaos'' of intellectual property law.
DNA material including genes, gene fragments (called expressed sequence tags or ESTs), and related products, are considered to be patentable subject matter. The Patent Act does not cover ''the gene as it occurs in nature'' (Utility Examination Guidelines), 26 but when a gene has been isolated and purified it is considered to have been modified. This makes it a ''new composition of matter'' eligible for patent protection. This conclusion seems consistent with the U.S. Congress's apparent intention that the patent statute cover ''anything under the sun that is made by man''.
27 Three types of patents are possible: structure patents, covering the isolated and purified gene; function patents, covering a new use for the DNA in question (such as a diagnostic test or gene therapy); and process patents which cover a new method of isolating, purifying, or synthesizing this DNA material. 28 The patentability of genetic material such as DNA sequences is an intricate and complex issue. Supporters of those patents argue that without the incentive of patents the genome will not be adequately exploited by researchers. Opponents such as Hettinger 29 argue against patents out of respect for life, which should not be the subject of patents. The source or raw material for the gene patents is human tissue, and some ethicists claim that patents should not be given for human material.
The validity and scope of patent protection in the human genome is a question we cannot settle here. But the issue of gene patentability is analogous to the question of ownership of an individual's genetic information and deserves some treatment. What is particularly significant in the Moore decision is the claim that ''private ownership of genetic materials could dull the pace of medical innovation''. 30 We have argued that this principle should apply to the ultimate sources, that is, patients and donors supplying genetic information and raw material (such as human tissue). But it should also apply to a limited extent to third party researchers and their claims for human gene patents.
As we have observed, the problem is that substances which are upstream in the research cycle must be made easily accessible for downstream research. According to Horn, 31 ''This kind of information is considered basic research and provides the data that is necessary for making end products such as drugs, diagnostic tests, and other treatments based on genes and their products.'' The gene is a basic tool of research, and according to some critics, seeking an exclusive right to a gene by means of a patent is like 25 J. Boyle ''trying to gain ownership of the alphabet''. 32 When DNA is abstracted from human tissue or blood the goal is to produce a gene that functions exactly as it would in the human body. The lab that does this work can get a patent for this gene or DNA sequence even though the utility of this ''invention'' is sometimes vague or trivial and the gene in question may be critical for future research projects conducted by other scientists. We now know, for example, that there are many diseases caused by defects in multiple genes. According to Pinto (2002) , research has shifted from Mendelian diseases (involving a single gene) to ''polygenic disorders'' involving several genes. But under the current system researchers will need to locate the patentees of these genes and pay royalty fees for doing research. As Horn (2002) points out, ''if the licensing and transaction costs are too high, these valuable downstream innovations [such as therapeutic and diagnostic products] will never take place.'' It is a mistake, therefore, to award proprietary rights too far upstream in the research and development value chain for biotech products. This includes patents for genes and gene fragments and it also includes providing property rights in the ultimate source material: human tissue and the genetic information that it contains. As we have seen, the upshot of granting such rights is a tragedy of the anti-commons: resources will be under utilized and downstream research and commercialization efforts will be hampered.
In addition, loosely awarding proprietary rights too far upstream in the value chain will most likely raise the cost of downstream innovations. According to Pollack (2002) , about 14% of the cost of gene therapies is attributable to the royalties that must be paid to gene patent holders. Those costs will surely increase even further if donors of DNA samples or participants in genetic studies also demand royalties for therapeutic products based on their genetic information.
It is also worth considering whether or not gene patents can be justified on a normative basis. For example, are they justifiable when viewed from the perspective of Locke's labor-desert theory? Stripped of its subtleties, that theory claims that labor engenders a property right. According to Locke, people engage in labor not for its own sake but to reap its benefits; as a result, it would be unjust not to let people have these benefits they take such pains to procure. In short, property rights are required as a return for the laborers' painful and strenuous work. As Locke 33 maintains, one who takes the laborer's property ''desire[s] the benefit of another's pains, which he has no right to.'' In the case of gene fragments the labor desert view provides no support since little labor is involved in sequencing these fragments. 34 On the other hand, sequencing the entire gene is more labor intensive so a patent for a full length gene appears to be on firmer ground.
But Locke calls for limits on the acquisition of property even when a property right seems to be commensurate with the labor performed. According to Locke, the bestowal of a property right should be denied unless there is ''enough, and as good left for others . This proviso, when applied to intellectual property, implies that the granting of a property right should not harm the intellectual commons. In this context, awarding an exclusive entitlement will interfere with the research activities of other scientists who will find it difficult to pursue related or similar research trajectories. As Shaw 35 indicates, there is compelling evidence that gene patents are having ill-effects on research: ''With genetic patents staking private claims to huge chunks of [genetic] code, researchers and clinicians are finding their genetic research and diagnostic efforts thwarted by various restrictions imposed by commercial, and in some instances, academic, patent holders.'' Given that the commons is impaired by the removal of a gene that has been patentented, a Lockean justification for genetic patents seems dubious. Arguably, a modified property right that requires access at a reasonable cost (for example, some form of compulsory licensing) will resolve this problem and be more consistent with Locke's liberal philosophy of property rights.
Given the high social costs of strong and broad patent rights, they are also hard to justify from a utilitarian perspective. There is a case to be made, however, on utilitarian grounds for some types of gene patents as a basis for stimulating genetic research. The American Medical Association advocates patents on processes used to isolate and purify gene sequences, substance patents on purified proteins, and gene patents ''only if the inventor has demonstrated a practical, real world, specific and substantial use (credible utility) for the [gene] sequence''. 36 Thus, according to this policy a gene patent would not be awarded as a tool for scientific research but only in cases where a practical use has been demonstrated. The AMA policy also calls for access to gene patents by all ''certified laboratories at a reasonable cost'' so that other researchers will be able to build upon these innovations (Horn, 2002) . These limited genetic patents would preserve incentives but minimize interference with downstream research initiatives.
But what about the protection of privacy and autonomy rights? Are we sacrificing these basic human goods for the sake of biomedical research? Absolutely not. We have made a tenable case on utilitarian grounds that property rights in genetic material are unsound since the social costs are disproportionate to the benefits received. Those costs include the inhibition of research and higher prices for therapeutic products and genetic screenings. Society benefits tremendously from the enhancement of human health through biomedical research and when that research is constrained the social welfare loss (such as undeveloped treatments or genetic screening products) is quite substantial. It may be that privacy and autonomy are marginally safer with a property right, but, as we will demonstrate in the next section, sound privacy legislation based on informed consent can also be an effective means of ensuring genetic privacy and autonomy.
Some might still argue that social welfare concerns such as innovation in biotechnology should not decisively trump an ownership right in one's genetic material and information. But there is no evidence that a property right is a necessary condition for protecting the privacy of genetic information or the autonomy of genetic data subjects. It is certainly possible to develop an alternative means for safeguarding genetic privacy. Thus, the enhancement of biomedical research and the protection of privacy are not mutually incompatible goals. The principle of informed consent can go a long way to protect basic human rights without the need for an exclusive entitlement.
Privacy and informed consent
In order to address the matter of privacy we can turn for some guidance to normative frameworks such as Moor's (2001b) notion of just consequentialism. As Moor and others have opined, it is problematic to resolve ethical questions such as this one purely on the basis of utility or social welfare concerns. While the ''good'' or end does justify the means to some extent, it should not justify the use of unjust or unfair means. One of the problems with consequentialism has been its lack of sensitivity to ethical principles such as justice in the name of pragmatically optimizing consequences.
In the case of genetic information, the moral imperative is to guarantee each individual's privacy and autonomy by keeping this information strictly confidential and respecting the person's right to determine how that information will be utilized. As we have demonstrated, genetic information is highly sensitive and its unauthorized distribution has the potential to cause significant harm. This need to safeguard confidentiality for the sake of privacy and autonomy is demanded by the principles of justice and fairness. An impartial observer, behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance would not want to risk the loss of control over his or her genetic information. That person would not want such information to be made available to others without permission, given the potential for harm. Rather, she would want to be able to restrict access and determine how that information is utilized by third parties.
At the same time, the means of achieving this end, the protection of genetic privacy, are open and variable. The choice of these means should depend to some extent upon factors such as efficiency and social welfare. If there are several equivalent options for how we can achieve this moral imperative we should select the option that optimizes social welfare, which should be understood as the aggregate well-being of members of society. As long as we protect the basic human goods of privacy and autonomy, we should not adopt needlessly inefficient methods that might waste important opportunities such as the enhancement of human health. Prudence dictates that we attend to the consequences of our decisions and policies so long as we foster human well-being and do not interfere with one's integral participation in human goods such as privacy and autonomy. The ideal should be a solution that most fairly respects the rights of vulnerable stakeholders (donors of genetic material and genetic data subjects) while ensuring that the negative externalities associated with protecting those rights are minimized.
As we have been at pains to insist in the previous analysis, the upstream propertization of genetic material is most likely to hamper research by increasing transaction costs. Privacy and autonomy can also be protected by mechanisms that do not involve property rights such as informed consent. We cannot review the nuances and details of a sound genetic privacy statute but we can suggest its general requirements. Well-crafted litigation should guarantee that ''the individual has the right to be informed and to control subsequent use of biological material from the individual's body' ' (Ito, 2003) . This legislation should prohibit the covert collection of DNA, ''require an individual's voluntary consent for collection and analysis of DNA, and … require that the DNA collectors obtain a written, informed consent before dispersing any genetic information to anyone else' ' (McLochlin, 2001) . The law should also prohibit genetic discrimination. Where applicable, the law should require hospitals and researchers to inform patients of their intention to use tissue or other genetic source material for commercial applications.
The overriding objective is to prevent misappropriation and misuse of this genetic data, and this goal can be accomplished by implementing these strictly enforced controls such as informed consent and the requirement of strict confidentiality. There is no empirical evidence that we cannot achieve this objective by means of this alternative as opposed to the granting of property rights. As a general principle, we should avoid treating information as property unless it is absolutely necessary. As Samuelson (1991) 37 has noted, ''A world in which all information is … property under all circumstances is unthinkable.'' Therefore, given that informed consent and legally mandated confidentiality requirements do not impose the same level of transaction costs as property rights a presumption should be given to the use of informed consent as a means of assuring that privacy and autonomy rights will be safeguarded. The law should also be strictly enforced with stiff penalties for violators. It may be that the Iceland's Act on a Health Sector Database does not adequately protect privacy rights given the nature of the sensitive data in the IHD. But the remedy for this problem is not to succumb to the temptation to grant property rights in the genetic material of Iceland's citizens. Rather, the solution is to avoid presumed consent for the living and deceased and to require that each data subject's freely-given informed consent be given before the inclusion of their medical and genetic data in the IHD.
Similarly, international law needs refinement and enhancement so that it will adequately protect the autonomy of indigenous people whose genetic material is attractive to foreign researchers. A discussion of how to avert gene piracy is beyond the scope of this essay, but Ching (1997) describes how international law could evolve to ensure that the right of selfdetermination is better safeguarded. Of course, the same basic principle of full informed consent would be a basic part of this solution. In addition, some developing countries are already requiring that those applying for intellectual property rights prove that they have the consent of native citizens. 38 Finally, it should be pointed out that although the vision articulated by Miller (1969) and Branscomb (1994) of personal information as property has never been realized, privacy rights have not eroded throughout the world. While the U.S. track record on privacy protection is not exemplary, privacy rights are reasonably well protected in Europe thanks to the European Union Directive on Privacy. This directive requires that any ''identifiable person'' must be guaranteed fundamental privacy rights. It provides a model statement of principles (such as informed consent) that has been translated into regulatory systems which adequately safeguard the privacy rights of most European citizens. 39 The European experience demonstrates that property rights are not a necessary condition for the preservation of privacy and suggests that the protection of genetic privacy can be accomplished by means of a clear and consistent genetic privacy directive.
Access and equity issues reconsidered
One last related issue deserves some brief elaboration. What about access to the DHA in Iceland? As we have seen, deCODE has argued that without exclusive access rights there is no incentive to invest, and there is some merit to this claim. Intellectual property rights or liability rules that dictate the terms of access generally provide that incentive. What's necessary in this case is a careful balance between a reward structure that acknowledges those incentives and broad access to this information for the sake of scientific research and the common good. While de-CODE's reward seems sufficient, more should be done to ensure greater access to this resource. One of the major criticisms of the IHD was lack of access for scientists who were not employed by deCODE. We must object to this if we consistently follow the principles suggested by our analysis that emphasize limited genetic patents and broader access to genetic data. If we deny that Iceland's citizens have a proprietary right in their genetic source material for the greater good of scientific research, it seems contradictory to assert that deCODE Genetics should have a de facto property right by virtue of its exclusive access to this information and its ability to reap the lion's share of the rewards. Government nor deCODE Genetics should be vested with a quasi-property interest that gives them exclusive, custodial control over this research data. Currently, the Iceland Act on a Health Sector Database (1998) provides for a committee that will make all decisions about access, but one of the three members of that committee is a deCODE employee. The committee is expected to allow access unless there is an ''adverse effect'' upon deCODE's commercial interests. There seem to be two problems with this provision. First, this criterion is too general and onesided; other factors need to be considered such as the merits and expected results of the proposed research. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the deCODE representative will take a very broad view of the term ''adverse effects'' and as a result legitimate access will be denied. According to Jonatansson (2000) , this cozy arrangement implies that ''scientific access to data is … not accorded on scientific grounds.'' What's necessary is a better balance between regard for deCODE's financial incentives and the need for less fettered access to this data. One possibility is a compulsory licensing scheme that would avoid the potential for biased judgments by this committee. This scheme, if properly and fairly implemented, will provide deCODE with compensation for its investment without proprietary controls. Such an arrangement seems to be a more equitable means of ensuring the availability of this data while avoiding exclusive access to this data which is tantamount to a quasiproperty right for deCODE Genetics. Another alternative for providing liberal access to this data on objective grounds is to redefine the criteria for access. As we have suggested, those criteria should take into account the scientific merits of proposed research along with ''adverse effects'' on deCODE's investment. Efforts should also be made to ensure that the committee is impartial so that the public interest is fully represented. The committee should make its determinations about access to and licensing of this data based purely on the merits of each case (Jonatansson, 2000) .
Finally, what about the issue of compensation for Iceland's DNA donors and others who contribute their genetic material? Justice demands a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of research. While donors should be fully informed about the profit potential and incentives of deCODE Genetics, if they willingly and altruistically provide their genetic material it may be hard to see any inequity. In some cases, however, a donor may deserve to share more directly in the tangible benefits of successful research.
Informed consent, which must include informing donors about the potential financial value of their donated genetic material (particularly diseased material), is a good starting point for protecting donors' interests. The presumption, however, is that any cell line for downstream products (such as a test for a genetic mutation) would be developed from an aggregation of many donor cells. As Epstein (2003) observes, ''if genetic materials gathered from a large cohort of treated individuals is used to concoct some new genetic compound … no compensation … seems appropriate.'' In the vast majority of cases the rewards for each Icelander's participant would be minimal. On the other hand, if there is a situation where a cell line is developed exclusively from one donor's cells and that cell line had great therapeutic value, the donor deserves to share in the benefits of this research as a matter of fairness. We must acknowledge the valuable nature of this raw biological material before it is donated for research along with the donor's entitlement to some compensation for providing that material. As a general principle, companies and research labs that refuse to compensate under these circumstances are acting unjustly and should be subjected to moral and social pressures if they fail to live up to their obligations. These situations are rare, however, and should not require a new regime of property rights in human tissue. Beyond any doubt, there is a need to better allocate the financial benefits of genetic research that takes into account the donor's interests when that donor makes a contribution that has material value. But this should be accomplished through revised public policy rather than the introduction of new property rights.
Conclusions
This paper has scrutinized in a cursory way deCO-DE's unique agreement with the government of Iceland, which gives the company an exclusive license to construct a genetics database using medical records and genetic information from patients. This type of genetic research is being emulated by other private companies engaged in ''bio-prospecting,'' that is, the development of genetic databases of small homogenous populations. The purpose of this bio-prospecting is to locate key genes with potential medical significance. The collection of this data raises troubling privacy issues and the deCODE case allows us to see how positions regarding privacy rights and access privileges can be polarized. Proprietary rights in source material such as cells and genetic information will better protect privacy and ensure some compensation for donors. However, recognizing these ''rights of sources'' will preclude unfettered access and hinder genetic research. A regime of exclusive ownership also entails the risk of opportunistic hold-up. On the other hand, if this genetic data is simply considered to be part of the public domain, research opportunities will be greatly enhanced. But privacy rights might be in some jeopardy and data subjects will have no ability to recover any benefits from the commercial exploitation of their genetic data. There is a compelling need, therefore, to find some reasonable middle course of action, a proper balance between data protection and access.
While that middle course may be hard to discern, we must resist the impulse to propertize genetic information and the DNA samples from which it is derived, despite legitimate concerns about the need to safeguard privacy rights. A property regime for genetic information is an overreaction and a misguided solution to this problem. As we have insisted, genetic data should be unencumbered by proprietary rights, as the State of Oregon has belatedly realized. Otherwise we will end up with a tragedy of the anticommons. The Moore v. Regents of California case has also confirmed this conclusion. Upstream property rights are not conducive to the advancement of scientific research and must be replaced by an ethos of information sharing. Those rights include patents for genes and gene fragments, which should be awarded on a more limited basis in accordance with the AMA's policy. Instead of relying on property rights, privacy and autonomy should be safeguarded by strongly enforced laws that protect genetic information by informed consent and tight regulations governing the disclosure of such information (including genetic test results).
It remains somewhat unclear whether the Icelandic Government or deCODE Genetics fully accept that philosophy since they rely in some cases on presumed consent. Informed consent should be implemented as the universal standard for inclusion. Also, as we have argued, if data subjects must forego proprietary rights in their genetic information for the sake of facilitating research, then we must conclude that a private company or the government should not have proprietary entitlements to data, since such an entitlement might also impede genetic research among other scientists throughout the world. Instead, there is a need for a liberal access policy to this critical genetic data that takes into account the necessary role of investment incentives. Compulsory licensing to certified researchers at a reasonable cost is one way to achieve this tenuous balance.
